







The Republic of Turkey’s involvement in sub-Saharan Africa, in general, 
and Somalia, in particular, marks one of the most exciting and widely 
misunderstood geopolitical and strategic events of the twenty-first cen-
tury. Turkey is now considered a resident power in the Horn of Africa 
and the Red Sea region. By resident power, we mean states that do not 
possess territory outside a particular region, but nonetheless must be 
taken into consideration in terms of that region’s security and politics. 
Turkey, a state that geographically straddles Europe and the Middle 
East, possesses no territory in the Horn of Africa but nonetheless is a 
relevant state actor vis-à-vis the Horn’s politics and security. In short, the 
actions Turkey takes in Somalia have a direct impact on the region. 
From its humble beginnings as a humanitarian relief actor in 2011, 
Turkey has become a political and economic heavyweight in the region, 
with trade topping $650 million with Ethiopia, flights operating daily 
from Istanbul to Djibouti, Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, and Turkish 
officers training the largest contingent of Somalia’s armed forces in 
Mogadishu.1 Its largest foreign embassy in the world is in Somalia’s 
capital, Mogadishu, and Turkish companies operate Somalia’s most 
critical and lucrative infrastructure: Mogadishu’s international airport 
and port. The Turks have built hospitals, paved roads and thousands 
of Somalis are educated in Turkey each year. A marvelous tactility 
surrounds Turkey’s actions in Somalia. This separates it from other 
external states that have participated in high-profile (and high profit) 
ventures in Somalia for years with little to nothing to show for it.2 
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Turkey’s presence is welcomed by many in the Horn—its president 
(and former prime minister), Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is so popular that 
many Somali baby boys are named after him; girls are named Istanbul. 
While Ethiopia has been the quiet epicenter of Turkish investment, and 
Sudan has been integral to Turkish diplomacy in Africa, it is in Somalia 
that Turkey has made the biggest international splash. This has gen-
erated fears about Turkey’s power projection to the region. The rulers 
of some Arab Gulf states see a neo-Ottoman grand strategy at work 
in Ankara’s attempts to restore an Ottoman port town in Sudan and 
Turkish control of critical dual-use infrastructure in Somalia. Accord-
ingly, they have taken measures to rollback what they see as undue 
Turkish influence in their backyard.3 In the Horn itself, however, Tur-
key’s image remains generally positive.4 
Given its precipitous rise as an important factor in the region’s 
political economy, many scholars have attempted to explain Turkey’s 
sudden interests and actions in the region and, more particularly, 
Somalia.5 What is clear is that Turkey’s humanitarian impulses were 
quickly superseded by economic motivations.6 These, in turn, were 
complemented with an increasingly robust Turkish political presence 
in Mogadishu. In fact, writing about Turkey in Somalia really means 
writing about Turkey in the capital.7 This is entirely in line with nearly 
all external state actors operating in Somalia, but it also means the 
peripheries of this vast country are frequently ignored. As such, little 
attention has been paid to Turkey’s actions outside Mogadishu, in the 
country’s federal states and autonomous or independent regions.8 
To fill this gap, the article offers a (re)appraisal of Turkey’s engage-
ment with Somalia from the vantage point of the Republic of Somalil-
and, a de facto independent, but de jure internationally unrecognized 
political entity. Using a qualitative methodology supported by inter-
views and observations from Somaliland, the author critically reas-
sesses Turkey’s posture, actions and interests, contextualizing them 
with Somaliland’s core national interests. The findings demonstrate 
that Turkey is negatively perceived in Somaliland on account of 
Ankara’s “One Somalia” policy, its training and arming of the Somali 
National Army (SNA) and its ongoing support of Mogadishu’s polit-
ical elite who wish to see a return to the pre-civil war Somali Union. 
Thus, both the underpinnings and combination of Turkey’s actions, 
while certainly not directed against Somaliland per se, have the poten-
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tial to negatively affect Somaliland’s national interests, cherished inde-
pendence and sovereignty of action.
II. Somaliland: From Voluntary Union to Independence
Somaliland occupies a strategic location at the southern entrance to 
the Red Sea (see Map 1). It has been de facto independent from the 
Somali Union since 1991, but remains internationally unrecognized, 
and is claimed by Somalia’s government. Mogadishu believes it has 
strong claims to Somaliland, and the international community of states 
tacitly agrees. It is Somalia, not Somaliland, that occupies seats at the 
United Nation (UN) and the African Union (AU); Mogadishu hosts 
international embassies, Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital, does not (with 
limited exceptions). This, despite the fact that Somaliland—previously 
British Somaliland, a British Protectorate for over three-quarters of a 
century—achieved its first independence on June 26, 1960, and was 
duly recognized by 35 states and the UN (see Map 2).9 Nevertheless, 
caught up in the wave of Somali nationalism sweeping across the 
region, the newly independent Somaliland opted to enter a voluntary 
union with what was formerly Italian Somalia, an Italian colony and, 
subsequently. an Italian Trust Territory.10 On July 1, 1960, the two states 
formed the Somali Republic or Somalia. 
Figure 1: The Republic of Somaliland. Source: By Petercorless - 
This vector image includes elements that have been taken or 
adapted from this file: Us-attack-in-somalia-01082007-2134.svg 
(by Petercorless~commonswiki)., CC BY 2.5, https://commons.
wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=105638490 
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Figure 2: Colonial British Somaliland and Italian Somalia map 
(in Italian). Source: By MacMoreno at Italian Wikipedia, CC 
BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?cu-
rid=65233852
The promise of the union quickly faded as Somalilanders found 
themselves sidelined from key political posts in the union’s new cap-
ital, Mogadishu, by their more numerous cousins who were, after all, 
on their home turf.  Just one year after its promulgation, Somalilanders 
voted against the Union Constitution and, in December 1961, mili-
tary units revolted in Hargeisa in a failed bid to restore Somaliland’s 
independence. The union’s initial attempts at democracy, already 
seeing the first signs of rot by 1961, were binned in 1969 when the 
army’s commander, Mohamed Siad Barre, led a successful coup d’etat. 
Somalia became a “top-down developmental dictatorship” where Siad 
elevated his own Darod clan and consolidated his power.11 Somalia 
experimented with Marxism and curried favor with the Soviet Union, 
fielding one of the largest and best-equipped armies on the continent, 
only to cozy-up to the United States just prior to Barre’s disastrous 
invasion of Ethiopia.12 The Ogaden War sowed the seeds for an even-
tual Somali civil war (actually, multiple wars), the results of which 
continue to reverberate. The death knell of the Somali Republic finally 
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came in 1991, the same year Somaliland declared its exit from the 
union and reestablished its independent statehood.13 
III. Turkey in Somalia: Undercutting Somaliland’s Viability
In 2011, when Turkey’s then prime minister, Erdoğan, visited Mog-
adishu, the Republic of Somaliland was already two decades old. 
Given the intransigence of the Somaliland issue, and the instability 
its undecided status brings to the Horn region, the ingress of a new 
and hands-on external state such as Turkey offered the opportunity to 
shake things up. Indeed, the humanitarian nature of Turkey’s initial 
foray into Somalia looked benign, even promising to Somalilanders. 
Turkey’s economic, political and military power as well as its Ottoman 
history in Somaliland made it a desirable partner.14 Yet Mogadishu is 
the locus of Turkey’s energy and outreach, not Somaliland. Despite 
this, Somalilanders visit Turkey for medical treatment or for higher 
education. As such, if Turkey’s actions in Somalia are removed from 
the equation, its reputation holds up quite well in Somaliland.
Ten years on, its reputation in Somaliland is in tatters. Somaliland’s 
unique legal and political limbo have conspired to translate Turkey’s 
support of the Somali government into a zero-sum game, one where 
the accrual of more power by the Somali state—the political elite com-
prising successive Federal Governments of Somalia (FGS)—equals a 
corresponding decrease in power for Somaliland. In this reduction-
ist scenario, Somalia’s political leaders will eventually amass enough 
force to exercise a monopoly on violence over the length and breadth 
of the historical Somali Union. That Somaliland considers itself legally 
and politically separate—based on current and historical precedence—
is immaterial to Mogadishu’s leaders; to them, Somaliland forms an 
integral part of Somalia. This situation turns the ostensibly well-mean-
ing policies of Turkey and other external states—and, by extension, 
their official support for “One Somalia”—into a loaded gun aimed 
directly at Somaliland.15
Given their history, Somalilanders understandably pay great atten-
tion to and cherish their sovereignty and territorial integrity. These, 
along with international recognition for Somaliland’s independence, 
form their core national interests. Somaliland fulfills the criteria for 
legal independent statehood as understood by both the AU and the 
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UN. Its independence therefore sets no new legal precedents. Yet 
its successes—its democratically elected government prints its own 
money, issues passports and monopolizes the legitimate use of force 
across the majority of its territory—performed  over the course of three 
decades with little to no outside assistance, have not resulted in its 
official recognition.16  This fact, one for which successive Somaliland 
governments bear partial blame, only adds insult to injury for the three 
generations of Somalilanders who have grown up outside the bro-
ken union .17 Bashir Goth, Head of the Somaliland Mission in the US, 
stated: “when you’re fighting for recognition [of Somaliland’s inde-
pendence], everything else becomes secondary.” Somalilanders largely 
agree, and 97 percent supported their independence from the Somalia 
Union in a 2001 referendum.18 
Because Somaliland’s primary national interest have everything to 
do with its de facto independent status and the maintenance thereof, 
Turkey’s actions in Mogadishu have arguably done more than any 
other external state to empower Somalia’s government and military. 
By way of explanation, a state’s primary national interests revolve 
around territory, sovereignty and security. As such, primary security 
threats generally emanate from a state’s near abroad. States also have 
secondary and tertiary national interests that are less concrete and thus 
prone to change. These can include various objectives of foreign policy 
such as increased influence and prestige.19 It is safe to say that Tur-
key’s primary national interests have nothing to do with Somalia and 
Somaliland. Turkey’s actions in Somalia form part of its secondary or 
tertiary interests. Somaliland’s primary national interests, on the other 
hand, are severely threatened by Turkey’s actions in Somalia. 
This raises the stakes exponentially for Somaliland and offers a 
great deal of explanatory power when it comes to the exasperation 
expressed by Somalilanders about Turkey. As such, Turkey’s empow-
erment of the FGS and the SNA—very much in line with the primary 
national interests of Somalia and directly threatening those of Somalil-
and—has the potential, more than any other development over the 
past three decades, to snuff out Somaliland’s independence. This is 
therefore a highly emotive issue, one that Dr. M. Nasir Ali, Director of 
the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Har-
geisa, voiced when he stated: “Turkey is seen as an actor that is not 
impartial when it comes to Somalia-Somaliland issues. We see Turkey 
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as an actor which is not neutral but one that backs Mogadishu’s rul-
ers.” Ali opined, “Why do we see millions of dollars going to Somalia 
[from Turkey]?... Turkey is a state that is allying with Somaliland’s 
counterpart [Somalia] that is adversarial.”  
For his part, Suleiman Elmi, a management consultant for Somalil-
and’s Ministry of Finance, opined Turkey’s “One Somalia” policy was 
informed by its own national interests, namely its domestic political 
problems associated with the Kurdish issue. According to Elmi, Tur-
key’s “Kurdish problem” meant that Ankara shrunk away from any 
talk of separatism. He argued, however, that the background of Tur-
key’s conflict and the ongoing political issues bedeviling Somalia-So-
maliland are “totally different,” because Somaliland was a separate 
entity—as a British Protectorate, and subsequently an independent 
state—prior to voluntarily forming a union with the Italian Trust Terri-
tory of Southern Somalia. Elmi’s reference to the ongoing armed strug-
gle for an independent state or autonomy in Turkey’s southeast by 
ethnic Kurds was echoed by Ali, who highlighted that Somaliland’s 
intellectuals and government both understand Turkey’s government 
links the issue of Somaliland’s independence with Turkey’s own Kurd-
ish problem. “This is why Turkey is antagonistic toward Somaliland’s 
independence,” Ali explained. “[Turkish leaders think] If we show 
sympathy for Somaliland’s independence, then this will be picked up 
on by [Turkey’s] Kurds and used against the [Turkish] state.”
Even as Somaliland and Somalia held talks circa 2012 to 2016, as 
described below, the policies and actions of Turkey and other external 
states operating in Somalia continued to support “One Somalia.”20 This 
brazenly ignored on-the-ground realities, such as Somaliland’s strong 
legal case for independent statehood and recognition; its decades of 
sovereignty as well as its history; and lastly, the fact Somalia’s FGS 
does not hold a monopoly on the use of force—legitimate or illegiti-
mate—in Mogadishu, let alone in regions outside the capital.21 In other 
words, the FGS is legitimate in the eyes of the international commu-
nity, but illegitimate in much of the country it claims to govern. How 
then does the international support for “One Somalia” make sense? 
Elmi vented his frustrations: “Honestly, I don’t know what the interna-
tional community wants as a whole. There is not one [Somali] nation. 
The reality is very different. Demanding ‘One Somalia’ over and over 
again will not lead to a settlement.”
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Despite its firm stance against recognizing Somaliland’s inde-
pendence, has Turkey’s involvement in Somalia led to any positive 
spinoffs in Somaliland? When the interviewees were asked about Tur-
key in Somaliland, they only mentioned education and medical care, 
both occurring in Turkey. Ali, for instance, highlighted that Turkey 
now accepts Somaliland higher education, primary and secondary 
school certificates without condition. He added, however, Turkey con-
tinues to deny visas to Somaliland passport holders with the exception 
of Somaliland government officials. As such, Somalilanders who wish 
to study in Turkey must travel to Mogadishu to procure a Republic of 
Somalia passport. Only then will their Turkish visa be issued. Giving 
voice to the frustration many Somalilanders feel about Turkey’s inac-
tion in their own country, Goth boldly states, “I didn’t see any [positive 
actions taken by Turkey in Somaliland]. There have been no develop-
ment projects, not even humanitarian assistance.” 
IV. Turkey’s Role in Somaliland-Somalia Talks 
The first talks aimed at addressing the political chasm between 
Somaliland and Somalia began in London in 2012, 20 years after the 
break-up of the Somali Union. Prior to the London talks, Somaliland’s 
leaders had adopted a strict policy of non-negotiation with Somalia. 
This was instituted for three main reasons.22 First, the Somali regions 
to Somaliland’s south lacked a functioning government with which to 
negotiate given the ongoing civil wars. Second, when a series of tran-
sitional and then federal governments were created, they continued to 
ignore Somaliland’s independence, instead claiming it had violently 
seceded. Third, Somalia’s successive governments have all refused to 
acknowledge the atrocities committed in Somaliland by the Somali 
armed forces in 1988.23
After London and a brief turn in Dubai, Turkey’s turn to host talks 
came in 2013 and 2014, with negotiations held in Istanbul as well as 
president-level talks in Ankara. Talks planned for 2015 in Istanbul fell 
through and were followed, in 2016, by a final round of talks between 
intellectuals in Ankara.24 The talks hosted in Turkey did yield some 
ephemeral successes. Agreements were signed, for instance, by gov-
ernment officials from both states related to their sharing of humanitar-
ian aid, the controlling and monitoring of joint air space, cooperating 
in the security sector, and combating illegal fishing. 
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Somalilanders left Turkey with promissory notes. They were already 
frustrated with the negotiation process, in general, seeing it as a venue 
for international grandstanding by host states rather than a useful 
platform for resolving long-standing issues and grievances. More spe-
cifically, the refusal of Somali officials to sit in the same room rankled 
Somalilanders, and again underscored Mogadishu’s refusal to recog-
nize Somaliland’s independent status. Nevertheless, FGS officials were 
in Turkey, signing agreements with government officials from Somalil-
and. This, in and of itself, was indicative of a grudging acceptance of 
Somaliland’s status by both the FGS and the talks’ hosts, Turkey. That 
the results of the talks proved costly to Somaliland was what really 
turned Somalilanders against Turkey. 
Somalilanders have a history of checkered deal making with their 
southern cousins. Perhaps because of this, they were not completely 
surprised when the agreements signed publicly and officially in Tur-
key were neither honored nor fulfilled by Somalia. Indeed, every point 
agreed to in Turkey was rejected or never enacted by FGS President 
Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, also known as Farmajo, soon after he 
took office in 2017. In 2018, for example, the FGS abrogated the previ-
ous agreement it made with Somaliland that allowed direct interna-
tional assistance to Somaliland instead of through Mogadishu. When 
Mogadishu assumed airspace control from the International Civil Avi-
ation Organization (ICAO) in 2019, it was a complete rejection of its 
shared airspace plan with Hargeisa.25 According to one report, “This 
move reversed a previously negotiated plan that would have estab-
lished a joint regulatory body in Somaliland’s capital, with Hargeisa 
and Mogadishu sharing the revenues accruing from overflights.”26 
The perfidy of Mogadishu’s political elites was on full display for 
Edna Adan Ismail, current Presidential Envoy of the Republic of Somalil-
and, former Foreign Minister and founder of the Edna Adan Hospital 
and Edna Adan University. Adan highlighted that not only did Soma-
lia assume control, but “[President] Farmajo’s rejection of the airspace 
agreement has jeopardized Somaliland’s airspace and airports. Farmajo 
has forbidden the ICAO to provide technical support to Somaliland. 
This is criminal and endangers air safety and aircraft… [Hargeisa Air-
port] is an airport with medical evacuations as well as civilian and com-
mercial aircraft. Airport operations should be well-coordinated, and the 
airport should be well-serviced in order to assure safety.” 
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The retraction of agreements signed in Turkey—and Ankara’s subse-
quent silence—were viewed as ominous signs in Hargeisa. Turkey had 
clearly sided with Mogadishu, from Hargeisa’s perspective, and thus 
could no longer be considered a neutral host for any future Somalil-
and-Somalia talks. Speaking in a private capacity, Dr. Osman Sheikh 
Ahmed, Economic Advisor to the current Somaliland Government, 
believes that Turkey should only be included in future negotiations 
alongside other major states.27 “We know where Turkey stands [on the 
issue of Somaliland-Somalia] so we cannot trust them completely.” 
Osman also pointed out that negotiations—unless they involve the 
topic of mutual divorce or new relationship agreement—are now 
moot. He opined that Somaliland had moved ahead in its governance 
and democratic processes as evidenced by the parliamentary and local 
election held in May 2021.28 Somalia, on the other hand remains mired 
in conflict, instability and an absence of a democratic process. “The 
international community is not likely to push for negotiations as they 
did before,” added Osman, “and Turkey must realize the facts on the 
ground, its heavy investment in Somalia notwithstanding.”
V. Flying the Flag in Hargeisa
Turkey took a step many other external states have not: it opened a 
consulate in Hargeisa in 2014. Unlike its Ethiopian and Djiboutian 
counterparts which maintain a discreet presence, Turkey’s consulate is 
official and flies the Turkish flag. Yet Ethiopia’s and Djibouti’s low-key 
presence belies the fact that their offices act as de facto embassies, not 
satellite locations of their embassies in Mogadishu. Turkey’s consular 
presence in Hargeisa has, therefore, done little to improve its image.
When queried about Turkey’s consular presence in Somaliland, 
most interviewees saw it in a negatively nuanced light. For Goth, the 
consulate issues visas to Somalilanders who require medical treatment 
and students who wish to study in Turkey. Osman opined that he 
was not even sure if the Turkish consulate directly issues visas at all, 
perhaps indicating that Turkey uses its consulate as a vector for “One 
Somalia.” Elmi saw a more sinister motive: “I suspect that maybe their 
role [at the Turkish consulate] is to gather intelligence and give their 
relations [with Somaliland] a veneer of respectability.” Ali also saw 
Turkey’s consulate in Hargeisa in a negative political light.  “Mostly 
we [Somalilanders] see the consulate is serving as an actor pushing 
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an integrationist agenda for Somalia-Somaliland. It facilitates these 
activities.” Ali added that Turkish consular officials have attempted 
to normalize travel between Somaliland and Somalia, preferring, for 
example, to issue Turkish visas from their embassy in Mogadishu 
rather than the consulate in Hargeisa. In this, Ali argued, Turkey was 
conducting “business that is contrary to the well-being of Somaliland. 
They are doing what is in the interest of Turkey, and that is the unifi-
cation of Somalia-Somaliland.” He added that Turkish officials were 
isolated in Hargeisa as there was no political engagement by Somalil-
and government officials. Ali contrasted this with British officials who 
frequently liaised with their Somaliland counterparts or visited univer-
sities or other public venues to offer speeches or participate in discus-
sions.  
VI. Training an Army, Militarizing a Conflict
Turkey’s inaction in Somaliland contrasts sharply with its highly vis-
ible role in Mogadishu, which Ankara has made a veritable beehive 
of activity. And it is Turkey’s military and security support for Soma-
lia that elicited the strongest language from Somalilanders. Their ire 
was specifically directed against what they see as an existential threat 
posed by Turkey’s military presence in Mogadishu and its training of 
the SNA. Certainly, Somaliland’s precarious political position coupled 
with its historical trauma mean that the specter of a well-trained and 
equipped SNA is horrific for Somalilanders to contemplate. It signals, 
for many, the possibility of a violent, forced return to an unwanted 
union; a union that sidelined Somaliland for decades and eventually 
attempted to erase it. Yet, how does Turkey’s military training facility 
contribute to such doomsday predictions?  
Turkey opened its TURKSOM military training facility (Somali: 
Xerada TURKSOM; Turkish: Somali Türk Görev Kuvveti Komutanlığı) in 
2017, with the stated goal of training and preparing the officers and 
NCOs of the SNA. By October 2020, Turkish military trainers had per-
formed so well that they were training the sixth group of SNA infantry, 
totaling 450 soldiers, and providing them with basic military training, 
Anti-Terrorism Training and Exercise Center Command.29 They were 
part of a 5,000-strong battalion that Turkey hopes to train in order to 
bring total SNA troop numbers closer to the 15,000-16,000 promised in 
2017.30 
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Troops coming out of TURKSOM now form the “backbone” of the 
SNA and are among the best-trained and capable of troops, particu-
larly the Special Operations Command Battalion known as the Chee-
tah Unit (Somali: Ciidanka Haramcad) and the Eagles (Somali: Gorgor). 
Turkey’s training mission of the SNA is meant to provide the FGS with 
a professional, cohesive and truly national military force—including 
the country’s coastguard and navy—that can claw back the state’s 
monopoly on violence throughout the length and breadth of what the 
FGS considers to be Somalia. The mission’s success or failure are a 
critical factor in Somalia’s current security environment: the country 
has not possessed a viable military force since its breakup in 1991. In 
fact, the FGS continues to rely on foreign-backed security forces, par-
ticularly those functioning under the UN-approved and AU-operated 
African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) mandate. This not only 
means that soldiers from Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and other African 
states prosecute armed action in Somalia against the al-Shabaab terror-
ist group, but also provide security for critical facilities such as Mog-
adishu’s international airport and airport zone, home to a plethora of 
UN offices, foreign contractors and embassies. AMISOM troops, for 
example, are called on when security breaks down in Mogadishu, as it 
frequently does. Yet, SNA soldiers—trained and equipped by Turkey—
are increasingly called upon to take the fight to al-Shabaab and assume 
many of the roles and functions of AMISOM troops. Indeed, the major 
impetus for Turkey’s training efforts come directly from AMISOM’s 
imminent end of mission and, thus, their departure from Somalia.31 
There is increasing evidence of a more insidious angle to the activ-
ities of an increasingly powerful and capable SNA. The Cheetah Unit 
and Eagles have reportedly begun to perform operations informed by 
the politics of clannism, a particularly combustible prospect in Soma-
lia.32 Yet al-Shabaab—the destruction of which is the primary motivator 
driving the training efforts of external states and international organi-
zations—remains in control of large swathes of territory in southern 
and western Somalia despite over a decade of AMISOM operations 
and US drones strikes.33 The sum of these developments, involving 
a capable and increasingly politicized SNA, but one that appears to 
ignore the threat of al-Shabaab, are viewed with deep suspicion and 
concern in Somaliland, and may become increasingly problematic for 
Turkey. Despite its best efforts to remain above the fray of Somalia’s 
squabbles, often informed by Byzantine clan and sub-clan politics, 
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Turkey’s role in training effective fighting units is fraught. “There is 
little doubt that one of the pitfalls of [Turkey] training the SNA means 
that Turkey may get pulled by Somali politicians in directions it wishes 
to avoid. These include clan favoritism, regionalism, factionalism and, 
above all issues involving territorial integrity. Turkey may find this 
increasingly hard to avoid as the SNA, and therefore Somalia, become 
increasingly reliant on Turkey for the expertise, skillsets and matériel 
required to maintain the SNA.”34 Should Turkey get sucked into this 
maelstrom, it may find itself accused of being in collusion with the 
SNA in violent actions taking place across Somalia. 
Despite drawbacks, Somalia’s rulers have access to steady security 
sector assistance from external patrons. Somaliland, in contrast, has 
no benefactor like Turkey willing to train and equip its armed forces. 
While some police and coast guard training has occurred under the 
auspices of the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU), 
respectively, the UN arms embargo leveled against Somalia in 1992 
is still in place.35 Despite making do with very little, Somalilanders 
can see the proverbial writing on the wall vis-à-vis Turkish-trained 
SNA troops supplied with weaponry, including armored vehicles and 
assault rifles.36  After all, they followed the successes of Turkish-armed 
proxy forces in Libya and the Caucasus with an interest bordering 
on dread, taking stock of the incredible firepower and effectiveness 
of Turkish-made armed drones. Somalilanders are also aware of the 
increasingly large sales of Turkish-made weapons to other states in 
sub-Saharan Africa, but not to Somaliland.37 It is little wonder, then, 
that many see the Turkish-trained and armed SNA as an existential 
threat to Somaliland. Elmi, for instance, asked, “What would stop Tur-
key from giving drones to [Somali President] Farmajo, eventually tip-
ping the balance [of power]? Somaliland does not have an air force; it 
has no new military equipment. We are isolated…” Seconding Elmi, 
Ali noted the skepticism many Somalilanders have about the motives 
of both Turkey and Somalia. He opined,
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 “Turkey wants to show their military presence in the strategic Horn 
of Africa region. Somalia wants the SNA trained [by Turkey] to get 
military armaments [supplied by Turkey]. Because of the [UN arms] 
embargo, Turkey can use the training as cover to bring equipment and 
arms to Somalia. Under the cover of training, Turkey brings this [mil-
itary] hardware to Somalia… If Somalia builds its military capacity, 
they will try and invade Somaliland, which they believe is part and 
parcel of Somalia.”
For Goth, who remembered the carnage wrought by the SNA in 
Somaliland in 1988, it was simply a matter of time before Somalia 
attempted to forcibly bring Somaliland back to the union. 
If you look at how [Turkey is] building Somalia’s military capa-
bilities… and how [President] Farmajo is using them [Turk-
ish-trained troops] in Gedo and Galmadug, and to destabilize 
Jubaland to empower his own political loyalists, Somaliland 
watches and is worried.38 We see it as a driver of what Somalia 
may do to Somaliland. Imagine if Turkey gives Farmajo drones 
and military helicopters. This is a threat to us. We are getting 
neither military training nor assistance from the outside world… 
When the day comes and Somalia resolves its issues [of chronic 
instability], they will attack Somaliland. 
It was Adan’s response to questions about Turkey’s role in training the 
SNA that best demonstrated the burning anger some Somalilanders 
reserve for Turkey and its arming and training of the SNA. Her words 
deserve to be printed verbatim: 
We [Somaliland] are the enemy that the SNA is being trained for. 
We are to be defeated… We are the target, the supposed enemy. 
And once Somalia thinks it has the capability to launch an attack 
from Somalia, it will do so, as it did many times between 1982-
1990. The real problem for Somalia seems to be that we [Somalil-
anders] forgot to die when they [Somalia’s army] left us to die [in 
1988]. Instead, we have recovered, we have businesses, we have 
democracy. We are alive and refuse to die and that seems to be 
too much for Somalia. Rather than [Somalia] rebuilding them-
selves and bringing their refugees home, they are only focused on 
destroying the peace and stability Somaliland has secured. Our 
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blood will be on the hands of those who armed the criminals and 
allowed this to happen.
VII. Turkey’s Rejoinder
Somalia has a political significance for Turkey, one that pays divi-
dends, albeit minor, at the ballot box. That is, after a mere decade of 
building infrastructure, providing humanitarian aid and offering edu-
cation to thousands of Somalis in Turkey, Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and 
Development party (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)—increasingly 
under siege at home and abroad—can point to a veritable success story 
in Somalia, replete with all the trappings of Erdoğan’s “Ankara con-
sensus.”39  This Turkish triumph, nevertheless, largely ignores areas 
outside the purview of the FGS, which limits its impact and efficacy 
across most of the former Somali Republic. For Somaliland, Turkey has 
been an absent partner or unwanted meddler, at best. At worst, it is 
actively colluding with Somalia to erase Somaliland. What is Turkey’s 
response? 
When contacted for an interview, Turkish official sources confirmed 
that Turkey recognizes Somalia’s FGS as the only legitimate govern-
ment and, in line with other states and international organizations, 
does not recognize Somaliland’s independence. Nevertheless, Turkish 
official sources noted the important role Turkey plays in Somaliland, 
pointing to Ankara’s building-up of a dialogue mechanism to facilitate 
Somalia-Somaliland talks. In this, Turkey is ready and willing to “con-
tinue our contribution… should both parties wish so.” They added, “In 
all of our endeavors, we have been working closely with both sides, 
and [have] received [the] greenlight to continue our engagements.” 
The source of the “green light” was not written, but one could be safe 
in assuming it came from Mogadishu and not Hargeisa, given the dis-
appointments of Somalilanders over the previous talks’ outcomes, as 
described above. 
Turkish official sources, contrary to information provided by 
Somalilander interviewees, highlighted Turkey provision of human-
itarian and development assistance to Somaliland since 2013. When 
queried about the specifics of their work, they listed the over 120 
scholarships offered to Somaliland students between 2018-2019, the 
humanitarian aid provided by the Turkish Disaster and Emergency 
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Management Authority (AFAD) to Somalilanders affected by Cyclone 
Sagar in 2018, and the donation of $100,000 worth of medical equip-
ment to the Hargeisa Group Hospital in January 2019 by the Turkish 
Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), among others. Turk-
ish official sources also pointed to training performed by the Turkish 
Immigration Department for six Somaliland Immigration and Bor-
der Control Department officials in November 2018.40 These efforts 
form part of what Turkish official sources call “in kind” assistance to 
Somaliland given that Turkey does not provide any direct financial 
support to the de facto independent country. 
When asked about the Hargeisa consulate’s functional role, Turkish 
official sources noted it “mainly deals with the issues of our citizens in 
its mission area.” This is certainly a function of consulates around the 
world, but they often provide outreach and visa services, too. Turkey’s 
consular presence in Hargeisa is thus understandably mystifying to 
Somalilanders, and the answers of Turkish official sources largely con-
firmed that its consulate does not issue visas in Hargeisa. 
In terms of its training of the SNA, it is worth underscoring that 
Turkey is not acting alone in Somalia in this capacity. There are a host 
of state and non-state actors doing the same, albeit on a smaller scale.41 
As such, should Turkey discontinue its training mission there is little 
doubt that another set of actors would partially fill the void. Turkey is 
certainly on sound legal footing vis-à-vis its military training efforts—
they are in Somalia based on legal agreements with the FGS—and Tur-
key actively and directly contributes to the destruction of al-Shabaab. 
Turkish official sources also highlighted that their military training 
and equipment are not intended for a specific political actor or time 
period. Instead, as the political leaders of a sovereign state, the FGS is 
responsible for how and when it uses Somali security forces. Turkish 
official sources were adamant that Turkey played no part in the SNA’s 
chain of command. Indeed, when questioned as to whether certain 
FGS-ordered operations by the SNA would make Turkey reconsider its 





Turkey’s popularity in Somalia remains mostly undimmed.42 While 
opposition candidates in Mogadishu have decried Turkey’s supply of 
weaponry and the actions of Turkish-trained army units, there is little 
doubt that they would utilize such resources to affect outcomes in their 
favor should they become the next denizens of Villa Somalia.43 In other 
words, the tactile nature of Turkey’s engagement of Somalia—building 
roads, training soldiers, contributing to the government’s budget—are 
favored by Somalia’s “lumpen elite” as a way of making Somalia great 
again, a country that was once one of Africa’s most successful states 
with a powerful and well-regarded military and bureaucracy. 
There is little doubt that Turkey is a useful and increasingly import-
ant external state partner for Somalia’s government. Despite the rosy 
glow suffusing Turkey’s efforts, however, Somalia remains deeply 
fragmented, a shadow of its former self. Turkey’s policies are sound for 
functioning states, where money and support are provided to the cen-
tral government which then distributes them to the periphery based 
on political, economic or strategic needs. The FGS is not a fully sov-
ereign government, however, and maintains difficult relations with 
multiple member states. For these reasons, stacking more power in the 
hands of Mogadishu’s political elites is unlikely to significantly heal 
these fractures. Rather, a more likely scenario is one involving extreme 
violence engendered by the security environment, one that is charac-
terized by “personalized or neopatrimonial relationships and inter-
agency rivalries conducted amongst and between political elites and 
security actors such as police, militaries, intelligence agencies, special 
units, warlords, militia and commercial security companies.”44  Tur-
key’s efforts, despite their worthiness, are potentially lighting another 
fuse that leads to a steadily growing and combustible heap of clan and 
regional rivalries, historical grievances and a nihilism brought on by 
three decades of violence, corruption and misgovernment, and the 
concomitant frustration and exhaustion associated therewith.  
Somalilanders are cognizant of the top-down approach being taken 
in Mogadishu by the FGS’s external state patron, Turkey. Faisal Ali 
Warabe,45 Chairman of the For Justice and Development (UCID) polit-
ical party, scoffed, “Somalia does not need a strong navy. They haven’t 
yet reconciled their own internal problems. There’s not even a united 
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Italian Somalia yet. The whole concept and approach [by Turkey], is 
really not going to benefit anyone in Somalia. What is Turkey doing? It 
is putting the cart before the horse.” Despite the grim forecasts, some 
welcomed greater Turkish political and security assistance in Somalil-
and despite the vitriol they directed at Turkey for its role in empower-
ing Somalia at the possible expense of Somaliland’s independence and 
sovereignty. Elmi admitted Somaliland’s poverty and added that inter-
national assistance, from Turkey or others, is welcome. Warabe wished 
to see security sector assistance from Turkey. “We need to rebuild our 
military force, our naval force, our air force. We have a coast guard, 
but our coastline is huge. We need a navy, not a coast guard.” In other 
words, parity in Turkish security assistance to Somaliland and Somalia 
was desired, not one-sided actions in favor of Mogadishu. Adan con-
curred, arguing for “friendly relations, a partnership, collaboration as 
friends. Not just band aids.”
The concerns expressed by Somalilanders toward Turkey could 
be dispelled if Ankara chose to engage more with the other federal 
member states and regions of Somalia. The disparity between Turkey’s 
actions in Somalia, where it has invested millions and bilateral trade 
topped $250 million in 2019, and Somaliland is stark. Somalilanders 
view Turkey’s motives suspiciously given this disparity. The one-sided 
nature of Ankara’s engagement simply cannot be denied. Turkish aid 
organizations have set a small precedent in Somaliland by their pres-
ence, but official Turkish government support and funding remain tied 
up in Mogadishu. 
Somaliland, despite its strategic geography, successful democratic 
experience and secure environment has not risen to the level of a stra-
tegic partner, one that other internationally recognized states would 
stick their necks out for. In truth, Turkey would benefit little from 
its recognition of Somaliland’s independence. Turkish entities would 
likely be ejected from Somalia with a blanket ban like the one leveled 
against the United Arab Emirates (UAE) after Dubai’s DP World, a 
mega ports operator, refused to stop work on Somaliland’s Berbera 
port. Turkish companies would likely forfeit their lucrative contracts 
at the port and airport, and Turkey’s training facility in Mogadishu 
would likely be shuttered. It is surely Turkey’s ongoing, custodial role 
of these Somali infrastructure assets—its port and airport operations, 
its training camp and its direct funding of the FGS—that give Ankara 
139
Brendon J. Cannon
the power to pressure Somalia’s political elites should it choose to do 
so. To pretend Ankara does not have leverage over the FGS is a straw-
man argument. Yet, Turkish official sources bristled at the suggestion 
of using “pressure” on the FGS, noting that “Turkey’s role as a facilita-
tor does not envisage putting pressure on either party.” 
Turkey has the latitude of movement to shift its one-sided relation-
ship with Somalia to a more balanced one with Somaliland. Neither 
the impetus nor the rationale for such a move is yet there. This may 
change, however, according to the inimitable Edna Adan. “Somalia has 
a habit of never thanking those who help her… I don’t know how long 
that friendship can continue.” For Adan and the other Somalilanders 
interviewed, Somaliland’s position vis-à-vis Somalia and Turkey is 
clear: “We would rather remain unrecognized and stable as we have 
been for the past 30 years, than be recognized and become a complete 
mess like Somalia. We’ve conquered our obstacles. We’re closer than 
the moon is and certainly closer than Mars, the world is welcome to 
come and visit and try Somaliland.” 
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